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A HEARSAY EXCEPTION FOR 
PHYSICAL ABUSE 
On October 3, 1995 the jury for People l/. Simpson found 
the defendant, Orenthal James Simpson (hereinafter "OJ 
Simpson") not guilty of the murders of Nicole Brown Simpson 
and Ronald Goldman based on the evidence admitted. l 
In response to this verdict, the California legislature en-
acted a new hearsay exception, §1370 of the California Evi-
dence Code.2 This section allows the limited use of hearsay 
1. People v. Simpson, No. BA097211, 1995 WL 704381, at *2 (Cal. Super. 
Trans. Oct. 10, 1995). Nicole Brown Simpson's ex-husband, OJ Simpson, was 
charged with flrSt degree murder for his ex-wife's death, and second degree mur-
der for Ronald Goldman's death. OJ Simpson was acquitted of the murders. Id. 
Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald Goldman were murdered in June of 
1994. Nicole Brown Simpson wrote in her diary and told friends and family that 
OJ Simpson had beaten her repeatedly during their marriage, that she lived in 
fear of him and that he threatened to kill her. These statements were ruled inad-
missible hearsay. Rich Harris, State Law To Permit Use Of Nicole Simpson's Diary 
In Civil Trial, L.A. DAILY NEWS, September 5, 1996, at N10; Pamela Martineau, 
Goldman Tells Lawmakers To Adopt Bill To Broaden Exceptions For Hearsay Evi-
dence, METROPOLITAN NEWS, March 28, 1996, at 10. 
2. CAL. Evm. CODE § 1370 (West 1997) states: 
(a) Evidence of a statement by the declarant is not made 
inadmissible by the hearsay rule if all of the following 
conditions are met: 
(1) The statement purports to narrate, describe, or explain 
the infliction or threat of physical injury upon the declar-
ant. 
(2) The declarant is unavailable as a witness pursuant to 
§ 240. 
(3) The statement was made at or near the time of the 
497 
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evidence in certain domestic abuse cases.3 Section 1370 de-
fines a new hearsay exception for a declarant's hearsay state-
ments narrating, describing or explaining the infliction or 
threat of physical injury upon the declarant by the party 
against whom the statement is offered.4 This hearsay excep-
tion applies when the declarant is unavailable5 to testify as ·a 
[d. 
infliction or threat of physical injury. Evidence of state-
ments more than five years before the filing of the cur-
rent action or proceeding shall be inadmissible under this 
section. 
(4) The statement was made under circumstances that 
would indicate its trustworthiness. 
(5) The statement was made in writing, was electronically 
recorded, or made to a law enforcement official. 
(b) For purposes of paragraph (4) of subdivision (a), cir-
cumstances relevant to the issue of trustworthiness in-
clude, but are not limited to, the following: 
(1) Whether the statement was made in contemplation of 
pending or anticipated litigation in which the declarant 
was interested. 
(2) Whether the declarant has a bias or motive for fabri-
cating the statement, and the extent of any bias or mo-
tive. 
(3) Whether the statement is corroborated by evidence 
other than the statements that are admissible only pursu-
ant to this section. 
(c) A statement is admissible pursuant to this section only 
if the proponent of the statement makes known to the 
adverse party the intention to offer the statement and the 
particulars of the statement sufficiently in advance of the 
proceedings in order to provide the adverse party with a 
fair opportunity to prepare to meet the statement. 
3. Senate Oks Bill to Allow Some Hearsay Evidence, LA TIMES, August 15, 
1996, at A3S. 
4. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1370 (West 1997). 
5. CAL. EVID. CODE § 240 (West 1996). According to § 240, unavailable as a 
witness means the declarant is any of the following: 
(1) Exempted or precluded on the ground of privilege from 
testifying concerning the matter to which his or her state-
ment is relevant. 
(2) Disqualified from testifying to the matter. 
(3) Dead or unable to attend or to testify at the hearing 
because of then existing physical or mental illness or 
infirmity. . 
(4) Absent from the hearing and the court is unable to 
compel his or her attendance by its process 
(5) Absent from the hearing and the proponent of his or 
her statement has exercised reasonable diligence but has 
been unable to procure his or her attendance by the 
court's process. 
2
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witness at the trial.6 
Governor Wilson signed the new exception for hearsay 
testimony of physical abuse into law on September 4, 1996.7 
The California legislature made the evidentiary statute effec-
tive immediately in order to permit the admission of relevant 
evidence of physical abuse in various criminal and civil pro-
ceedings. s The legislature did not intend for this new hearsay 
exception to affect other evidentiary requirements,9 impair a 
Id. 
6. Id. 
(b) A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if the 
exemption, preclusion, disqualification, death, inability, or 
absence of the declarant was brought about by the pro-
curement or wrongdoing of the proponent of his or her 
statement for the purpose of preventing the declarant 
from attending or testifying. 
(c) Expert testimony which establishes that physical or 
mental trauma resulting from an alleged crime has 
caused harm to a witness of sufficient severity that the 
witness is physically unable to testify without suffering 
substantial trauma may constitute a sufficient showing of 
unavailability pursuant to paragraph (3) of subdivision (a). 
As used in this section, the term "expert" means a physi-
cian and surgeon, including a psychiatrist, or any person 
described by subdivision (b), (c), or (e) of Section 1010. 
7. Stephen Green, Expansion of 'Hearsay Rule' Ok'd, THE SACRAMENTO BEE, Sep-
tember 5, 1996, at A3. 
8. 1996 Cal. Legis. Servo Ch. 416 (A.B. 2068) (West Sept. 4, 1996). The bill 
providing for this new hearsay exception states: 
Id. 
SEC. 3. This act is an urgency statute necessary for the 
immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or 
safety within the meaning of Article IV of the Constitu-
tion and shall go into immediate effect. The facts consti-
tuting the necessity are: In order to permit the admission 
of important evidence in various civil and criminal pro-
ceedings as soon as possible, it is necessary that this act 
take ~ffect immediately. 
"The legislative action is expected to clear the way for the admission of 
diaries kept by Nicole Brown Simpson, in the civil trial of OJ Simpson, set to 
begin in September." Stephen Green, Expansion of 'Hearsay Rule' Ok'd, THE SACRA. 
MENTO BEE, September 5, 1996, at A3. 
9. 1996 Cal. Legis. Servo Ch. 416 (A.B. 2068) (West Sept. 4, 1996); Section 
one of the bill for this new hearsay exception refers specifically to §§ 351 and 352 
of the California Evidence Code. The comment to § 351 states: 
The Evidence Code contains a number of provisions that 
exclude relevant evidence either for reasons of public 
policy or because the evidence is too unreliable to be 
presented to the trier of fact. See, e.g., Evidence Code § 
3
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party's right to attack the credibility of the declarant pursuant 
to § 1202,10 or affect the defendant's right to discovery for the 
purposes of producing rebuttal evidence attacking the 
declarant's credibility.11 The legislature did intend that § 1370 
be used in a manner consistent with a defendant's due process 
and confrontation rights under the Federal and California 
Constitutions. 12 
Prior to this new exception, California law excluded rele-
vant and trustworthy hearsay evidence of a defendant's threats 
and infliction of physical abuse directed toward the declarant 
when the declarant's statements did not conform to any of the 
existing hearsay exceptions.13 The most publicized example of 
this function of California law was the exclusion of hearsay 
statements made by Nicole Brown Simpson in her diary and to 
her friends and family, describing threats and physical abuse 
by her ex-husband, OJ Simpson.l4 Apparently, Nicole Brown 
Id. 
352 (cumulative, unduly prejudicial, etc. evidence), §§ 900-
1070 (privileges), §§ 1100-1156 (extrinsic policies), § 1200 
(hearsay). 
CAL. EVID. CODE § 351 (West 1996). 
Section 352, discretion of court to exclude evidence, states "The court in its 
discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of 
time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, 
or of misleading the jury." CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1996). 
10. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1202 (West 1996). Section 1202, credibility of hearsay de-
clarant states: 
Id. 
Evidence of a statement or other conduct by a declarant 
that is inconsistent with a statement by such a declarant 
received in evidence as hearsay evidence is not inadmissi-
ble for the purpose of attacking the credibility of the 
declarant though he is not given and has not had the 
opportunity to explain or deny such inconsistent statement 
or other conduct. Any other evidence offered to attack or 
support the credibility of the declarant is admissible if it 
would have been admissible had the declarant been a 
witness at the hearing. For the purposes of this section, 
the deponent of a deposition taken in the action in which 
it is offered shall be deemed to be a hearsay declarant. 
11. 1996 Cal. Legis. Servo Ch. 416 (A.B. 2068) (West Sept. 4, 1996). 
12. Id. 
13. Evidence; Hearsay Exceptions, 1995·1996 Regular Session, July 2, 1996: 
Hearings on AB 2068 Before the California Senate Judiciary Committee (1996). 
14. Id. 
4
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Simpson made these statements in order to .reveal her poten-
tial murderer. 15 In the Simpson criminal trial, the prosecution 
offered the hearsay statements made by Nicole Brown Simpson 
in her diary and to others relating the infliction of physical 
abuse by her ex-husband, under the state of mind hearsay 
exception, § 1250.16 However, the statements were inadmissi-
ble under that exception.17 The author of the bill proposing § 
1370 stated that a jury should have evidence of a victim's 
statements of the infliction or threats of physical abuse by the 
defendant, if sufficiently corroborated.18 The new hearsay ex-
ception allows for the admission of such evidence, but only 
when the strict requirements of § 1370 are met. 19 
This Comment will trace the history of the hearsay rule 
under both common law and California law.20 It examines the 
early use of the common law state of mind hearsay exception 
regarding statements of fear and physical abuse.21 It will also 
discuss the enactment of the California Evidence Code (herein-
after "Code") and the later codification of the state of mind 
hearsay exception.22 In addition, it will examine People v. 
Ruiz,23a case which applied the Code's state of mind hearsay 
exception to prohibit statements regarding the victims' fear of 
the defendant and the physical abuse which the defendant 
inflicted on the declarants.24 This Comment will examine the 
rationale behind the new hearsay exception,25 the particular 
requirements of § 1370,26 and its compliance with other provi-
sions of the Code and the California Constitution.27 Finally, 
this Comment will examine the application of § 1370 to the 
admission of evidence in the civil trial against OJ Simpson. 
15. Pamela Martineau, Goldman Tells Lawmakers to Adopt Bill to Broaden Ex· 
ceptions for Hearsay Evidence, METROPOLITAN NEWS, March 28, 1996 at 10. 
16. People v. Simpson, No. BA097211, 1995 WL 21768, at *4 (Cal. Super. Doc. 
Jan. 18, 1995). 
17. [d. 
18. CAL. COMM. ANALYSIS STATEMENT, AssEMBLY FLOOR BILL No. 2068, 8120/96. 
19. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1370 (West 1997). 
20. See, infra notes 29-115 and accompanying text. 
21. See, infra notes 29-90 and accompanying text. 
22. See, infra notes 91-104 and accompanying text. 
23. People v. Ruiz, 749 P.2d 854 (Cal. 1988). 
24. See, infra notes 105-115 and accompanying text. 
25. See, infra notes 116-123 and accompanying text. 
26. See, infra notes 124-151 and accompanying text. 
27. See, infra notes 152-177 and accompanying text. 
5
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II. BACKGROUND 
Hearsay evidence is evidence of a declarant's out of court 
statement which is offered for the truth of the matter asserted 
in the statement.28 The chief reasons for excluding hearsay 
evidence are that such statements are not made under oath, 
the adverse party has no opportunity to cross-examine the 
declarant, and the jury is unable to observe the declarant's 
demeanor while making the statement.29 
Both the United States Constitution and the California 
Constitution contain a Confrontation Clause that guarantees a 
criminal defendant the right "to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him."30 Use of the Confrontation Clause is lim-
ited to criminal prosecutions and is available only to the ac-
cused.31 Thus, it is unavailable to the prosecution in a crimi-
nal proceeding or to either party in civil litigation.32 
Although the Confrontation Clause makes no provision for 
hearsay exceptions,33 one of its basic purposes is to promote 
the integrity of the fact finding process.34 The Supreme Court 
has consistently held that the Clause does not necessarily 
prohibit the admission of hearsay statements against a crimi-
nal defendant, even though the admission violates the literal 
terms of the Clause.35 This has led to a debate as to whether 
the Clause simply constitutionalizes the hearsay rule for the 
criminal defendant, or whether it places limitations on the 
introduction of evidence admissible under the hearsay rule and 
28. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1200 (West 1996). Section 1200, the hearsay rule, defines 
hearsay as "evidence of a statement that was made other than by the witness 
while testifying at the hearing and that is offered for the truth of the matter stat-
ed." Id. 
29. People v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 154 (1970). 
30. U. S. CONST. amend. VI; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15. The constitutional provi-
sions state "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him." Id. 
31. CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK"S HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF EVIDENCE, § 252, 
at 441 (John W. Strong et al. eds., 4th ed. West Publishing Co. 1992) [hereinafter 
McCormick]. 
32. Id. 
33. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15. 
34. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356-57 (1992). 
35. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 813 (1990). 
6
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its exceptions.36 The most recent Supreme Court decisions 
seem to suggest that the Clause constitutionalizes the hearsay 
rule, at least as applied to firmly rooted hearsay exceptions. 37 
In Ohio v. Roberts,38 the Court considered the impact of 
the Confrontation Clause on the admission of hearsay state-
ments falling under the federal hearsay exception for former 
testimony.39 The Court held that when a statement falls un-
der a hearsay exception which requires the unavailability of 
the declarant, the Confrontation Clause also requires the state-
ment bear "adequate indicia of reliability."40 A hearsay state-
ment is considered "reliable" when it falls within a long estab-
lished or firmly rooted41 hearsay exception.42 In other cases, 
the statement must be excluded absent a showing of particu-
larized guarantees of trustworthiness.43 Trustworthiness is 
determined from circumstances surrounding the statement and 
the trustworthiness of the declarant.44 
[d. 
36. McCormick, supra note 31, § 252, at 441. 
37. [d. 
38. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 u.s. 56 (1980). 
39. [d.; FED. R EVID. 804(b)(1). Section 804 states: 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the 
declarant is unavailable as a witness: 
(1) Fonner testimony. Testimony given as a witness at 
another hearing of the same or different proceeding, or in 
a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course 
of the same or another proceeding, if the party against 
whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action 
or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportuni-
ty and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, 
cross, or redirect examination. 
40. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66-74 (1980). 
41. Illinois, 502 U.S. at 355-56 n.8 (1992). The White court, in determining 
whether certain hearsay exceptions were firmly rooted, considered three factors: 
the amount of time the hearsay exceptions had been in existence, whether the 
Federal Rules of Evidence recognized the hearsay exception, and whether the ex-
ception is widely recognized by the states. [d. 
42. Wright, 497 U.S. at 815-17 (1990). The United States Supreme Court held 
that "[aldmission under a firmly rooted hearsay exception satisfies the constitution-
al requirement of reliability because of the weight accorded long-standing judicial 
and legislative experience in assessing the trustworthiness of certaiD. types of out 
of court statements." [d. 
43. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (1980). 
44. McCormick, supra note 31, § 324, at 538-39. Section 324 states factors in 
evaluating circumstances of trustworthiness, which include, but are not limited to, 
whether the declarant had a motivation to speak truthfully, the duration of time 
lapse between the event and the statement, whether the declarant had first hand 
7
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However, in United States v. Inadi,45 the Court refused to 
extend Robert's Confrontation Clause requirements to out-of-
court co-conspirator statements.46 Similarly, in White v. Illi-
nois,"7 the Court refused to extend the Robert's unavailability 
rule to two hearsay exceptions: statements for the purposes of 
medical diagnosis46 and spontaneous declarations,"9 holding 
knowledge, whether the statement was spontaneous or in response to leading ques-
tions and whether the declarant later recanted or affIrmed the statement. Id. 
45. United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986). 
46. FED. R EVID. 80l(dX2)(E). Under this section, such statements are party 
admissions and are not considered hearsay. This section defines statements of co-
conspirators as "a statement by a co-conspirator of a party made during the course 
and in furtherance of the conspiracy." Id. 
However, under the California Rules of Evidence, statements of co-conspira-
tors are hearsay and fall under a specific hearsay exception. Section 1223, admis-
sion of a co-conspirator, states: 
Evidence of a statement offered against a party is not 
made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if: 
(a) The statement was made by the declarant while par-
ticipating in a conspiracy to conunit a crime or civil 
wrong and in furtherance of the objective of that conspira-
cy; 
(b) The statement was made prior to or during the time 
that the party was participating in the conspiracy; and 
(c) The evidence is' offered either after admission of evi-
dence sufficient to sustain a finding of the facts specified 
in subdivisions (a) and (b) or, in the courts discretion as 
to the order of proof, subject to the admission of such 
evidence. 
FED. R EVID. 801(d)(2)(E). 
lnadi, 475 U.S. at 392-95 (1986). The Court held that Roberts did not stand 
for such a wholesale revision of the law of evidence, or such a broad interpreta-
tion of the Confrontation Clause. Rather, Roberts was limited to the constitutional-
ity of introducing former testimony when the witness was unavailable at the 
defendant's criminal trial. Thus, the Robert's analysis applies only when the prose-
cution seeks to admit former testimony in place of live testimony at the trial. The 
Court reasoned that former testimony is a weaker substitute for live testimony, 
lacking independent significance in its out-of-court context. Thus, if the declarant 
is available, there is no reason to rely on the hearsay statement. However, if the 
declarant is unavailable, than no better version of the evidence exists and the 
former testimony substitutes for live testimony. Conversely, unavailability is not 
required for co-conspirator statements because such statements are made during 
the conspiracy and derive their value from their out-of-court context which cannot 
be replicated at trial. Id. 
47. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992). 
48. FED. R EVID. 803(4). Under this section, the statements is not excluded by 
the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness.' Section 
803(4) defines statements for the purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment as 
statements "describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sen-
sations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source there-
of insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment." Id. 
49. FED. R EVID. 803(2). Under 803(2), excited utterances are not excluded by 
8
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that such statements satisfied the Confrontation Clause be-
cause they fell under firmly rooted hearsay exceptions. 50 
In Idaho v. Wright,51 the Court imposed constitutional 
limitations on nontraditional hearsay exceptions.52 There, the 
Court held that statements falling under such hearsay excep-
tions are not firmly rooted53 and are presumptively unreliable 
and inadmissible for the purpose of the Confrontation Clause 
absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthi-
ness. 54 Trustworthiness is indicated from the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the making of the statement which 
render the declarant particularly trustworthy. 55 Statements 
not falling under firmly rooted hearsay exceptions require that 
the declarant's truthfulness be so evident from the surrounding 
circumstances that cross-examination is of marginal utility. 56 
In sum, hearsay statements falling under traditional or 
firmly rooted exceptions57 comply with the Confrontation 
Clause. 58 When the particular exception does not require un-
the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness. Excited 
utterances are defined as "A statement relating to a startling event or condition 
made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event 
or condition." [d. 
50. Illinois, 502 U.S. at 355 (1992). 
51. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990). 
52. [d. at 815-18. 
53. [d. 
54. [d. 
55. [d. at 820-21. 
56. Wright, 497 U.S. at 820-21. The Court gave examples of hearsay exceptions 
in which the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement indicate 
trustworthiness. The Court stated: 
[d. 
The basis for the excited utterance exception, for example, 
is that such statements are given under circumstances 
that eliminate the possibility of fabrication, coaching, or 
confabulation, and that therefore the circumstances sur-
rounding the making of the statement provide sufficient 
assurance that the statement is trustworthy and that 
cross-examination would be superfluous. Likewise the 
'dying declaration' and 'medical treatment' exceptions to 
the hearsay rule are based on the belief that persons 
making such statements are highly unlikely to lie. 
57. [d. at 820-21. The Court held that statements falling under firmly rooted 
hearsay exceptions are trustworthy because court precedence recognizes that ad-
versarial testing adds little to the statement's reliability. [d. 
58. McCormick, supra note 31, § 252, at 442-43. 
9
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availability, it is unlikely that the Court will hold that the 
Confrontation Clause requires such a showing. 59 However, 
where the exception requires unavailability, the. Clause will 
also require such a finding.60 Further, newly created statutory 
hearsay exceptions arguably should be subject to the test set 
forth in Wright requiring that hearsay exceptions which are 
not finnly rooted are inadmissible absent a showing of particu-
larized guarantees of trustworthiness.61 
A. COMMON LAw HEARSAY RULE 
At early common law no rules against hearsay existed.62 
However, common law judges realized that untrained jurors 
needed guidance in evaluating evidence, and therefore began to 
develop rules restricting the admissibility of evidence. 63 In 
addition, restrictions on admitting evidence were necessary to 
prevent jurors from being misled by irrelevant, biased or fraud-
ulent testimony.64 Restrictions were also needed to minimize 
the risk of jurors being persuaded by their own emotions, sym-
pathies, and prejudices.65 As a result, numerous exclusionary 
rules of evidence gradually developed throughout the 17th and 
18th century.66 These common law judges created a complex 
framework of rules in an attempt to ensure that only valuable 
and relevant evidence, free from the known risks of irrele-
vance, confusion and fraud, reached the jury.67 The American 
legal system aimed to use these rules based on extensive judi-
cial experience with parties, witnesses, and jurors, to attain 
the truth through careful reasoning.68 
At the turn of the 19th century, the early common law 
courts of England recognized the state of mind hearsay excep-
tion, using it to disclose the state of mind of the declarant.69 
59.ld. 
60.ld. 
61. Wright, 497 u.s. at 816-17 (1990). 
62. JOHN H. WIGMORE, A SnmENT"S TEXTBOOK OF THE LAw OF EVIDENCE, § 1, at 4-5 





67. Wigmore, supra note 62, § 1, at 4-5. 
68.ld. 
69. Averson v. Kinnaird, 102 Eng. Rep. 1258, at 1262 (K. B. 1805). The 
10
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [1997], Art. 10
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol27/iss3/10
1997] CALIFORNIA HEARSAY EXCEPTION 507 
Similarly, early California courts adopted the common law 
state of mind hearsay exception and used it to prove the 
declarant's fear of the defendant and the defendant's infliction 
or threat of physical abuse upon the declarant.70 However, 
other California courts rejected this approach, reasoning that 
the risk of the jury improperly using the statements for the 
truth of the charges facing the defendant, outweighed their 
probative value. 
1. People v. Merkouris71 
People v. Merkouris72 illustrates how California courts 
admitted hearsay evidence relating the victims' fear of the 
defendant under the common law state of mind hearsay excep-
tion.73 In Merkouris, the California Supreme Court ruled that 
when the identification of the defendant as the victim's killer 
is in issue, evidence of the defendant's threatening conduct is 
relevant to show the reasonableness of the victim's fear or the 
victims' fearful state of mind.74 The Merkouris Court ruled 
that hearsay statements of the two murder victims' declaring 
their fear of the defendant and intent to carry a gun, were 
admissible under the common law mental state exception to 
the hearsay rule.75 The trial court admitted the hearsay state-
ments to prove the victims' fear and their intent to avoid, and 
protect themselves from the defendant who had threatened 
them.76 
Averson court, one of the fIrst English common law courts to recognize the com-
mon law state of mind hearsay exception, admitted the declarant's -hearsay state-
ments relating the state of her own health at the time of the statement. [d. 
70. People v. Merkouris, 344 P.2d I, 7 (1959). The Merkouris court admitted 
the victims' statements relating their fear of the defendant under the common law 
state of mind hearsay exception. The evidence was admissible to prove the victims' 
fear and that they had reason to fear the defendant. [d. 
71. People v. Merkouris, 344 P.2d 1 (1959). 
72. [d. 
73. [d. at 6-7. 
74. [d. 
75. [d. 
76. Merkouris, 344 P.2d at 6-7. 
11
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2. People v. Hamilton 77 
In People v. Hamilton,78 the California Supreme Court 
implicitly contradicted the Merkouris rule79 by sharply limit-
ing the admission of a victim's declarations expressing fear of 
the defendant under the common law state of mind hearsay 
exception. so The California Supreme Court ruled that testimo-
ny of the declarant's state of mind relating to the victim's fear 
of the defendant were admissible only when the declarant's 
state of mind was itself the issue.81 The Court ruled that the 
victim's state of mind was placed in issue after the defendant 
testified that he and the victim had an amicable relationship 
and that the victim invited him to her house on the night of 
the murder.s2 Thus, the victim's declarations were relevant to 
cast doubt on the defendant's testimony.83 In addition, the 
Court ruled that when the declarant's state of mind is at issue, 
the hearsay declarations must be made under trustworthy 
circumstances.84 In Hamilton, the California Supreme Court 
found that the victim's statements were untrustworthy because 
they were made while the victim was trying to establish a 
defense for unlawfully carrying a gun. 85 
Further, the California Supreme Court ruled that when 
the declarant's fear of the defendant was at issue, the 
declarant's statements could refer only to the defendant's 
77. People v. Hamilton, 362 P.2d 473 (1961). 
78.Id. . 
79. People v. Merkouris, 344 P.2d 1 (1959). The Merkouris court admitted the 
victims' statements expressing fear of the defendant under the common law state 
of mind hearsay exception. Id. 
80. Hamilton, 362 P.2d 473, 473-74 (1961). In Hamilton, the trial court admit-
ted evidence of the victim's diary entries relating incidents of physical, mental and 
sexual abuse, and death threats from her ex-husband, the defendant. The trial 
court also admitted the victim's statements to police officers that she feared the 
defendant, that the defendant had beaten her and threatened to kill her. The trial 
court purportedly admitted all of the hearsay statements to show the murder 
victim's state of mind, that she feared the defendant. Id. 
81. Id. at 480. 
82. Id. at 477. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. at 481. The Court held that declarations directly asserting the 
declarant's mental state are admissible only when there is at least circumstantial 
evidence that the declarations are trustworthy and credible. Id. 
85. Hamilton, 362 P.2d at 481. 
12
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [1997], Art. 10
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol27/iss3/10
1997] CALIFORNIA HEARSAY EXCEPTION 509 
threats of future conduct.86 Thus, the lower court erred in ad-
mitting the victim's diary entries and hearsay declarations 
stating the victim's belief or memory to prove the defendant's 
past acts and state of mind.87 In addition, the court held that 
the prejudicial effect on the defendant far outweighed the ben-
efit of the statements for the prosecution. 
B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CALIFORNIA HEARSAY RULES 
1. California Evidence Code 
Prior to the enactment of the Code, California's statutes 
did not define hearsay or the hearsay rule.88 As a result, the 
hearsay rule and its exceptions were unclear, poorly organized 
and incomplete. 89 
On January 1, 1967,90 the California legislature adopted 
86. [d. at 480. 
87. [d. at 482 (quoting Shepard v. United State8, 290 U.S. 96 at 105-06 
(1933» (holding that declarations of intention, ca8ting light on the future, have 
been sharply distinguished from declarations of memory, pointing backwards to the 
past. There would be an end, or nearly that, to the rule against hearsay if the 
distinction were ignored). [d. 




90. CAL. EVID. CODE § 12 (West 1996). Section 12 states: 
(a) This code shall become operative on January 1, 1967, 
and shall govern proceeding in actions brought on or after 
that date and, except as provided for in subdivision (b), 
further proceedings in actions pending on that date. 
(b) Subject to subdivision (c),a trial commenced before 
January I, 1967, shall not be governed by this code. For 
the purposes of this subdivision: 
(1) A trial is commenced when the first witness is sworn 
or the fii-st exhibit is admitted into evidence and is termi-
nated when the issue upon which the evidence is received 
is submitted to the trier of fact. A new trial, or a sepa-
rate trial of a different issue, commenced on or after 
January I, 1967, shall be governed by this code. 
(2) If an appeal is taken from a ruling made at a trial 
commenced before January I, 1967, the appellate court 
shall apply the law applicable at the time of the com-
mencement of the trial. . 
(c) The provisions of Division 8 (commencing with Section 
900) relating to privileges shall govern any claim or privi-
lege made after December 31, 1966. 
13
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the California Evidence Code. The Code codified the rule 
against admitting hearsay, as well as exceptions to this rule.91 
While the Code states generally accepted hearsay exceptions, it 
allows the legislature and the courts to create additional hear-
say exceptions through statutes and case law.92 
The Code's rule against hearsay makes inadmissible any 
out-of-court statement offered for the truth of the statement 
when made other than by the witness while testifying at the 
hearing,93 unless the statement fits one of the predefined ex-
ceptions or some other exception found in statutory or case 
law.94 Yet, even if evidence meets the requirements of a par-
ticular hearsay exception, it is not automatically admissible.95 
The exceptions merely provide that such evidence is not inad-
missible under the hearsay rule.96 If there is another rule of 
law which makes the evidence inadmissible, such as undue 
prejudice, the court has discretion to refuse to admit the evi-
dence.97 
After the enactment of the Code, the courts often used the 
codified state of mind hearsay exception, § 1250,9S for admit-
91. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1200 (West 1996). Section 1200 defmes "hearsay evidence" 
as "evidence of a statement that was made other than by the witness while testi-
fying at the hearing and that is offered for the truth of the matter stated." Id. 
CAL. Evm. CODE §§ 1220-1370 (West 1997). The hearsay exceptions to § 1200 
include, but are not limited to, party opponent admissions, declarations against 
interest, prior statements by statements by witnesses, business and public records, 
spontaneous, contemporaneous and dying declarations, statements of then existing 
mental or physical state, statements of physical abuse and others. Id. 
92. Houghtaling v. Superior Court (Rossi), 21 Cal. Rptr.2d 855 at 858 (1993). 
The Houghtaling court held that "It is to be noted that although Evidence Code 
section 1200 bars hearsay evidence "except as provided by law," 'law,' in this con-
text, includes decisional law. Consequently, we are empowered to create, or recog-
nize, an exception not specifically set forth in the statutes." Id. 
93. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1200 (West 1996). 
94. Houghtaling, 21 Cal. Rptr.2d 855 at 858 (1993). 
95. CAL. EVID. CODE § 351 (West 1996). The comment to § 351, admissibility of 
relevant evidence states "The Evidence Code contains a number of provisions that 
exclude relevant evidence either for reasons of public policy or because the evi-
dence is too unreliable to be presented to the trier of fact." ld 
96. CAL. Evm. CODE § 1200 (West 1996). 
97. CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1996). 
98. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1250 (West 1996). Section 1250, statement of the 
declarant's then existing mental or physical state provides: 
(a) Subject to Section 1252, evidence if a statement of the 
declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, or physi-
14
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ting a victim's statements of fear of the defendant and state-
ments relating the defendant's infliction or threats of physical 
abuse.99 However, under Code § 1250, it is error to admit 
such statements unless the victim's state of mind or conduct in 
conformity with that fear is in dispute. loo Further, the Code 
codified Hamilton's trustworthiness requirements for admitting 
evidence under hearsay exception § 1250.101 . 
2. People v. Ruiz102 
People v. Ruiz103 exemplifies the manner in which the 
courts attempted to use § 1250 to allow a victim's hearsay 
declarations expressing fear of the defendant and reiterates 
the Code's statutory overruling of Merkouris. 104 In Ruiz, the 
California Supreme Court recognized that § 1250 of the Code 
creates an exception to the hearsay rule for the declarant's 
then existing state of mind. 105 However, the Ruiz Court limit-
ed the application of § 1250 to situations where the declarant's 
state of mind is at issue or when the statements are offered to 
prove or explain the declarant's subsequent acts or conduct 
[d. 
cal sensation (including statement of intent, plan. motive, 
design, mental feeling, pain, or bodily health) is not made 
inadmissible by the hearsay rule when: 
(1) The evidence is offered to prove the declarant's state 
of mind,· emotion, or physical sensation at that time or 
any other time when it is itself an issue in the action; or 
(2) The evidence is offered to prove or explain acts or 
conduct of the ·declarant. 
(b) This section does not make admissible evidence of a 
statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remem-
bered or believed. 
99. People v.· Pinn, 94 Cal. Rptr. 741, 744 (1971) (Hearsay statements in 
which the declarant told a witness that she feared the defendant and that he was 
"going to kill her," were admissible under the state of mind hearsay exception). 
100. People v. Ruiz, 749 P.2d 854, 862-63 (1988). 
101. CAL. Evm. CODE § 1252 (West 1996). The comment to § 1252 states "Section 
1252 limits the admissibility of hearsay statements that would otherwise be admis-
sible under Sections 1250 and 1251. If a statement of mental or physical state 
was made with a motive to misrepresent or to manufacture evidence, the state-
ment is not sufficiently reliable to warrant its reception in evidence. [d. 
102. Ruiz, 749 P.2d at 854-57 (1988). 
103. [d. 
104. Ruiz, 749 P.2d at 863-64 (1988). 
105. [d. at 862. 
15
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relating to that fear. 106 In addition, § 1250 cannot be used to 
prove the accused's conduct or motive to kill, nor can the hear-
say statements of the declarant's memory or belief be used to 
prove the facts remembered or believed.107 In Ruiz, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court held that § 1250 of the Code clearly 
overruled Merkouris,l08 as Merkouris was not based on any 
probability of reliability.l09 
In sum, § 1250 limits the use of a victim's statements of 
inflicted or threatened physical abuse, or the statements of a 
victim's fear of the defendant, to situations where the victim's 
state of mind is an issue in the action, or where the evidence 
explains the victim's conduct. 110 Section 1250 prohibits using 
the statements to prove the defendant's past acts.l11 Because 
§ 1250 is a narrow exception, it is often not a proper evidentia-
ry basis for admitting evidence of infliction or threat of physi-
106. Id. 
107. Id. at 863-864. 
108. People v. Merkouris, 344 P.2d 1 (1959). The Merkouris court admitted the 
victims' statements expressing fear of the defendant under the common law state 
of mind hearsay exception. 
109. Ruiz, 749 P.2d at 863. The California Supreme Court found no purpose for 
admitting the evidence other than to prove the defendant in fact killed the vic-
tims. Neither the victims' state of mind prior to their deaths nor their conduct in 
connection with that fear were at issue. The Ruiz court directly contradicted 
Merkouris, reasoning that the Merkouris use of the state of mind hearsay excep-
tion was not based on any probability of reliability, but on a rationale that de-
stroys the very foundation of the hearsay rule. Id. 
Id. 
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1250 (WFEf 1996). The comment to §1250 states: 
In Merkouris, the victims' hearsay statements relating the 
defendant's threats were in effect used to prove the truth 
of those threats, rather than for the purported purpose of 
showing the victims' state of mind as being fearful of the 
defendant. Section 1250(b) overrules Merkouris by making 
inadmissible evidence of a statement of memory or belief 
to prove the fact remembered or believed. Merkouris is 
repudiated in § 1250(b) because that doctrine undermines 
the hearsay rule itself. While other exceptions to the 
hearsay rule are based on some indicia of reliability pecu-
liar to the evidence involved, the Merkouris exception is 
not based on any probability of reality. Distinguished from 
Merkouris are cases in which a murder victim's state-
ments are used to prove or explain subsequent acts of the 
victim, and not as a basis for inferring that the defendant 
did the acts charged in the statement. 
110. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1250 (West 1996). 
111. Id. 
16
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cal abuse by the defendant upon the declarant. 112 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. THE RATIONALE BEHIND § 1370 HEARSAY EXCEPI'ION AND 
THE RELIABILITY OF STATEMENTS OF PHYSICAL ABUSE 
Hearsay statements allowed by the exceptions generally 
reflect circumstances of trustworthiness. 113 The California 
Supreme Court has determined that a statement's reliability is 
indicated not only by the words themselves, but from the sur-
rounding circumstances, the declarant's possible motivation in 
making the statement and the declarant's relationship with 
the defendant. 114 
Statements of threatened or inflicted physical abuse ad-
missible under § 1370 are analogous to statements falling 
under hearsay exception § 1230 of the Code, declarations 
against interest. 115 In general, declarations against interest 
are trustworthy because most people do not voluntarily make 
statements against their interests unless the statements are 
true. 116 Similarly, a declarant's statements relating inflict-
ed or threatened abuse could be considered generally trustwor-
112. People v. Ruiz, 749 P.2d 854 (1988); People v. Simpson, No. BA097211, 
1995 WL 21768, at *4-5 (Cal. Super. Doc. Jan. 18, 1995). 
113. In re Michael G., 24 Cal. Rptr. 260, 262 (1993). 
114. People v. Cudgo, 863 P.2d 635, 648 (1993) (quoting People v. Frierson 53 
Cal. 3d 730, 745 (1991». 
115. CAL. Evm. CODE § 1230 (West 1996). Section 1230, declarations against in-
terest states: 
Id. 
Evidence of a statement by a declarant having sufficient 
knowledge of the subject is not made inadmissible by the 
hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness 
and the statement, when made, was so far contrary to 
the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far 
subjected him to the risk of civil or criminal liability, or 
so far tended to render invalid a claim by him against 
another, or created such a risk of making him the object 
of hatred, ridicule, or social disgrace in the community, 
that a reasonable man in his position would not have 
made the statement unless he believed it to be true. 
116. Houghtaling, 21 Cal. Rprt.2d 855, 858-59 (1993) (holding that declarations 
against interest are based on the underlying theory that such statements carry 
deleterious personal consequences that a "reasonable man" would not have made 
unless he believed it to be true). 
17
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thy117 because simply recording, or reporting such incidents 
to a law enforcement official runs the risk that their abuser, or 
threatened abuser will discover the report and retaliate. us 
Thus, the threat to the declarant's physical well being ensures 
the truthfulness of the hearsay statement. 
However, fear of retaliation does not always underlie the 
hearsay statement and a lack of such fear may render the 
statement untrustworthy.119 As a result, § 1370 contains re-
quirements designed to eliminate those statements where the 
declarant is not motivated by a genuine fear of the abuser's 
retaliation. 120 
B. THE REQUIREMENTS OF § 1370 
Prior to § 1370, the courts often used § 1250, the state of 
mind hearsay exception, to admit statements of physical 
abuse. l21 However, § 1250 limited the use of such statements 
to show only the declarant's state of mind or explain the con-
duct of the declarant. 122 Conversely, § 1370 contains no such 
limitations, allowing the evidence to be used for all purpos-
es. 123 Hearsay evidence of inflicted or threatened physical 
abuse may be admissible if it complies with all six specified 
requirements of § 1370.124 These. requirements are similar to 
those found in other exceptions under the Code and act to 
ensure the statement is relevant and trustworthy, as well as to 
117. DEL MARTIN, BATl'ERED WIVES, 76 (Glide Publications 1976). The author ex-
plains that for battered women: 
[d. 
118. [d. 
A call to the police is generally an act of desperation 
done in an emergency situation. However, once the police 
leave, the woman and her attacker are face to face again, 
both knowing that she called the police "on her own hus-
band in his own home." Thus, calling the police inadver-
tently worsened the situation. 
119. People v. Hamilton, 362 P.2d 473, 481 (1961). The victim's statements of 
fear were not trustworthy because they were made while the declarant was trying 
to establish a defense for unlawfully carrying a gun. [d. 
120. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1370 (West 1997). 
121. People v. Pinn, 94 Cal. Rptr. 741, 744 (1971). 
122. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1250 (West 1997). 
123. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1370 (West 1997). 
124. [d. 
18
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [1997], Art. 10
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol27/iss3/10
1997] CALIFORNIA HEARSAY EXCEPTION 515 
protect and give the defendant a fair opportunity to meet the 
statement. 125 
1. The Statement Relates To The Threat Or Infliction Of 
Physical Abuse 
First, § 1370 requires the statement to narrate, describe, 
or explain the abuse or threat of physical injury upon the de-
clarant.126 This requirement ensures a connection between 
the event and the content of the statement,127 thereby guar-
anteeing that only the relevant information, the statements of 
inflicted or threatened abuse, is relayed in the statement. 128 
2. Unavailability Of The Declarant 
Second, § 1370 requires the declarant be unavailablel29 
as a witness. lao This requirement reflects the court's prefer-
ence for live witness testimony because the declarant is under 
oath, subject to cross examination and the jury can observe the 
witness's demeanor while making the statement.13l Although 
trial testimony is preferred, the "unavailability" of the witness 
necessitates resorting to the weaker substitute, the hearsay, in 
order to avoid a complete loss of the evidence.132 Meanwhile, 
125. See, infra notes 132-151 and accompanying text. 
126. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1370 (West 1997). Section 1370(aX1) states "The state-
ment purports to narrate, describe, or explain the infliction or threat of physical 
injury upon the declarant." [d. 
127. McCormick, supra note 31, § 272, at 477. 
An identical provision is found in hearsay exception § 1240 of the Code. 
Section 1240, spontaneous statement, provides "Evidence of a statement is not 
made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement (a) purports to narrate, 
describe, or explain an act, condition, or event perceived by the declarant; and (b) 
was made spontaneously under the stress of the excitement caused by such per-
ception." CAL .. EVID. CODE § 1240 (West 1996). 
128. CAL. EVID. CODE § 350 (West 1996). Section 350 states "No evidence is ad-
missible except relevant evidence." 
CAL. EVID. CODE § 210 (West 1996). Section 210, states "relevant evidence," is 
evidence, including evidence relevant to the credibility of a witness or hearsay 
declarant, having any tendency in logic to prove or disprove any disputed fact· that 
is of consequence to the determination of the action." [d. 
129. CAL. EVID. CODE § 240 (West 1997). 
130. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1370 (West 1997). Section (a)(2) states "The declarant is 
unavailable as a witness pursuant to § 240." [d. 
131. People v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 154 (1970). 
132. People v. Hughey, 240 Cal. Rptr. 269 at 275 (1987). 
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it shows that statements of physical abuse are not valuable 
enough in their out-of-court context· to render the availability 
of the declarant immaterial. 133 
3. Proximity In Time Between The Event And The Statement 
Third, § 1370 requires the statement be made at or near 
the time of the infliction or threat of physical injury and pro-
hibits statements made more than five years before the filing 
of the current action. l34 Recording the statement· at the time 
or soon after, guarantees the reliability of the statements be-
cause the event is fresh in the declarant's memory when re-
corded. l35 However, § 1370 prohibits statements made more 
than five years before the filing of the current action to ensure 
that the statement is not so remote as to render the statement 
untrustworthy and irrelevant. 136 
133. The reasoning underlying this requirement is demonstrated by the hearsay 
exceptions under the Federal Rules of Evidence, where certain exceptions require 
the unavailability of the declarant, while others consider availability immaterial. 
Similar to § 1370, § 804 (1)..(5) of the Federal Rules require the unavailability of 
the declarant. Those exceptions include (1) fonner testimony, (2) statement under 
a belief of impending death, (3) statement against interest, (4) statement of per-
sonal or family history (5) other exceptions. FED. R EVID. 804(1)-(5). 
However, 803(1)-(24) considers the availability of the declarant to be imma-
terial. The advisory committee note to § 803 states "The present nile proceeds 
upon the theory that under appropriate circumstances a hearsay statement may 
possess circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness sufficient to justify the non-
production of the declarant in person at the trial even though he may be 
available." FED. R EVID. 803(1)-(24). 
Additionally, two of the Code's hearsay exceptions, § 1240, spontaneous 
declarations, and § 1223, statements of co-conspirators, do not require unavailabili-
ty because such statements derive their value from the out-of-court context in 
which the statement was spoken. Thus, the hearsay statement is actually prefera-
ble to the available declarant's trial testimony. Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring 
the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendment, 35 UCLA L. REv. 557, 561-63 
(1988). 
134. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1370 (West 1997). Section 1370 (a)(3) states "The state-
ment was made at or near the time of the infliction or threat of physical injury. 
Evidence of statements more than five years before the filing of the current action 
or proceeding shall be inadmissible under this section." [d. 
135. McCormick, supra note 31, § 289, at 500. 
IJG. CAl .. EVID. CODE § 1370 (West 1997). Section 609 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, impeachment by evidence of conviction of crime contains a similar time 
limit. Section 609 (b) states: 
Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible 
if a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the 
date of the conviction or of the release of the witness 
20
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4. Trustworthiness Of The Declarant And The Statement 
Section 1370's fourth requirement is that the statement 
must be trustworthy.137 Section 1370 suggests criteria that 
the courts may use in evaluating the trustworthiness of the 
statement. l38 These criteria which focus on the declarant, in-
clude, but are not limited to, whether the statement was made 
in contemplation of pending or anticipated litigation in which 
the declarant had an interest, and whether the declarant had 
any other bias or motive for fabricating the statement.139 
Another factor which § 1370 suggests the courts may use 
in evaluating trustworthiness is whether the statement is 
corroborated by evidence other than the statements that are 
admissible only pursuant to § 1370.140 This last factor focuses 
on the surrounding circumstances, rather than the declarant, 
and considers whether other evidence supports the truth of the 
from the confinement imposed for that conviction, which-
ever is the later date, unless the court determines, in the 
interests of justice, that the probative value of the convic· 
tion supported by specific facts and circumstances sub-
stantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. However, evi· 
dence of a conviction more than 10 years old as calculat-
ed herein, is not admissible unless the proponent gives to 
the adverse party sufficient advance written notice of the 
intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse party 
with a fair opportunity to contest the use of such evi-
dence. 
FED. R. Evm. 609. 
The comment to 609(b) explains that this time limit is necessary because 
after ten years, the probative value of the conviction with respect to that person's 
credibility diminishes to a point that it should no longer be admissible. Additional-
ly, practical considerations and relevancy demand such a restriction. [d. 
137. CAL. Evm. CODE § 1370 (West 1997). Section 1370 (aX4) states "The state-
ment was made under circunlstances that would indicate its trustworthiness." [d. 
[d. 
138. [d. at § 1370(b). 
139. [d. 
140. [d. McCormick, supra note 31, § 324, at 539. Section 324 states: 
The courts have recognized further facts which do not 
bear on the declarant at the time he or she was speak-
ing, but which viewed in retrospect, tend to support the 
truthfulness of the statement. The most important of 
these is corroboration. Courts utilizing this factor have 
examined whether the other evidence in the case support 
the truth of the declaration. 
21
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statements. 141 
5. Recording The Statement 
Fifth, § 1370 requires the statement be written, electroni-
cally recorded or have been made to a law enforcement offi-
cial. 142 Requiring the declarant who experienced the abuse or 
threat of abuse to personally record the statement, ensures 
trustworthiness and accuracy.l43 In the alternative, the de-
clarant may allow a law enforcement official to record the 
statement. l44 The statement remains reliable because the of-
ficial is under a duty to accurately and truthfully report the 
statement. 145 
6. Notice 
Finally, § 1370 requires the party offering the evidence to 
give sufficient notice to the adverse party of their intention to 
use the statement. l46 The proponent of the evidence must 
give the particular details of the statement to allow the ad-
verse party a fair opportunity to prepare to meet the state-
ment.147 While strict compliance with similar notice require-
ments has sometimes been enforced, courts generally will tend 
to overlook this type of requirement if the need for the hearsay 
arises on the eve of, or during trial when possible injustice is 
avoided by the offer of a continuance or other measures. 148 
141. [d. 
142. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1370 (West 1997). Section 1370 (a)(5) states "The state-
ment was made in writing, was electronically recorded, or made to a law en-
forcement official." [d. 
[d. 
143. McCormick, supra note 31, § 10, at 16. 
144. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1370 (West 1997). 
145. McCormick, supra note 31, § 295, at 507. 
146. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1370 (West 1997). 
147. [d. Section 1370 (c) states: 
A statement is admissible pursuant to this section only 
if the proponent of the statement makes known to the 
adverse party the intention to offer the statement and the 
particulars of the statement sufficiently in advance of the 
proceedings in order to provide the adverse party with a 
fair opportunity to meet the statement. 
148. McCormick, supra note 31, § 324, at 539. E.g., United States v. Carlson, 
547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976) (The government's failure to give formal pretrial 
22
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C. SECTION 1370 AND OTHER CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE CODE RE-
QUIREMENTS 
Even if a victim's hearsay statement of physical abuse 
complies with the six requirements of § 1370, such evidence is 
not automatically admissible. 149 To be admitted the propo-
nent must show the evidence is relevant. 15o If the opposing 
party objects on the grounds that it is unduly prejudicial to the 
defendant, the proponent must show the probative value is 
greater than the prejudicial effect. 151 In a criminal proceed-
ing, the proponent faces additional challenges under the Cali-
fornia Constitution's Confrontation Clause. 152 
1. California Evidence Code § 350 
Pursuant to § 350 of the Code,153 the proponents of hear-
say evidence admissible under § 1370 must show the relevancy 
of the statements. l54 A proponent of such evidence might of-
fer the statements of physical abuse to prove the defendant 
murdered the declarant, or demonstrate the nature of the 
relationship between the declarant and the defendant. To be 
relevant, the evidence of physical abuse must be material to 
the issues specific to the particular case and tend to establish 
the proposition that it is offered to provel55 However, even if 
the evidence is relevant, and complies with § 1370, the judge 
could still refuse to admit such evidence based on other statu-
tory restrictions. 156 
notice of its intent to use the fonner testimony of a witness refusing to testify at 
trial due to intimidation by the defendant did not bar the admission of the evi-
dence). 
149. See, supra note 9. 
150. CAL. EVID. CODE § 350 (West 1996). 
151. CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1996). 
152. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15. 
153. CAL. EVID. CODE § 350 (West 1996). 
154. Id. 
155. McCormick, supra note 31, § 185, at 338-39. 
156. See supra note 9. 
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2. California Evidence Code § 352 
Pursuant to § 352157 of the Code, in civil and criminal 
proceedings, the trial judge has discretion to exclude the rele-
vant evidence admissible under § 1370 when the probative 
value is outweighed by the undue prejudice it may cause the 
defendant.158 Such evidence is that which necessitates undue 
consumption of time, creates substantial danger of undue prej-
udice, confuses the issues, or misleads the jury. 159 Section 
352 also applies to evidence which produces an emotional bias 
against the defendant and has little effect on the issues in the 
case. l60 
However, § 1370 does not place limitations on the use of 
the evidence. 161 Such permissible uses include, but are not 
limited to, proving the defendant carried out the threats and 
murdered the declarant, proving the declarant's or the 
defendant's state of mind, proving the defendant's past acts, as 
well as explaining the conduct of the declarant or the nature of 
the relationship between the declarant and the defendant. 162 
Moreover, § 1370 permits using the evidence for purposes pro-
hibited under § 1250.163 For example, § 1370 allows the evi-
dence to prove the state of mind of the declarant when it is not 
at issue and to prove the defendant's past acts. As a result, a 
defendant cannot argue that using the evidence to directly 
prove the truth of the charges is unduly prejudicial and thus 
barred from admission under § 352. However, a defendant may 
still argue that the evidence is unduly prejudicial because it is 
157. CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1996). Section § 352, discretion of the court to 
exclude evidence states "The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its 
probative value is outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) neces-
sitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue preju-
dice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.n [d. 
158. [d. 
159. People v. Simpson, No. BA097211, 1995 WL 21768, at *3 (Cal. Super. Doc 
Jan. 18, 1995). 
160. People v. Karis, 758 P.2d 1189, 1202-03 (1988). 
161. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1370 (West 1997). 
162. CAL. EVID. CODE 1370 (West 1997). Section 1370 contains no limitations on 
the use of evidence of physical abuse. [d. . 
163. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1250 (West 1996). Section 1250 limits using the evidence 
to prove the state of mind of the declarant when it is issue in the case or to 
prove the declarant's acts in conformity with the statement. Section 1250 prohibits 
using the evidence to prove the defendant's past acts. [d. 
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cumulative, unduly time consuming, or confuses or inflames 
the jury. 164 
3. California Constitution and The Confrontation Claus~ 
The legislature intended § 1370 to be consistent with the 
criminal defendant's constitutional right to confront witness-
es. 16S However, under Wright,166 newly created statutory 
hearsay exceptions are presumptively unreliable and inadmis-
sible under the Confrontation Clause unless the prosecution 
shows the statement possesses particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness. 167 Trustworthiness is shown when the evi-
dence fits under a long established hearsay exception,l68 or 
when the declarant and the surrounding circumstances are 
trustworthy. 169 
At the time of this writing, § 1370 has been in existence 
for less than a year,170 no related federal hearsay exception 
exists,171 and such an exception is not recognized by other 
states.172 Thus § 1370 does not qualify as a firmly rooted 
164. CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1997). 
165. 1996 Cal. Legis. Servo Ch. 416 (A.B. 2068) (West Sept. 4, 1996). 
166. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990). 
167. [d. at 818. 
168. [d. at 817. The trial court admitted the hearsay evidence under the Feder-
al Rules of Evidence hearsay exception § 803 (24) Other exceptions. The United 
States Supreme Court held that this residual exception sharply contrasts with 
firmly rooted hearsay exceptions by accommodating ad hoc instances in which 
statements not otherwise falling within a recognized exception might nevertheless 
be admissible at ~rial. "Hearsay statements admitted under § 803(24) of the Feder-
al Rules of Evidence almost by definition do not satisfy the same tradition of reli-
ability supporting the admissibility of statements . under a ftrmly rooted hearsay 
exception." [d. 
169. [d. at 815. B.E. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE, § 815, at 781 (Bancroft-Whitney 
1986). Section 815 explains that this limitation considers such factors as whether 
the statement is made before the controversy arose and whether the declarant has 
a motive to falsify. [d. 
170. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355-56 n.8 (1992). The White court consid-
ered two hearsay exceptions which had been is existence over two centuries, as 
"firmly rooted." [d. 
171. FED. R EVID. 803-804. 
172. A Westlaw search for a similar physical abuse hearsay exception in Wash-
ington, Oregon, and New York found no such exception in either case law or stat-
ute. For example, in People v. Asmar, a New York court refused to admit a 
victim's hearsay statements of fear of the defendant and other statements relating 
the physical abuse inflicted upon the declarant by the defendant. People v. Asmar, 
25
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hearsay exception.173 As a result, hearsay statements falling 
under § 1370 are presumed invalid and inadmissible under the 
Confrontation Clause unless the proponent shows the declar-
ant and the circumstances surrounding the statement of physi-
cal abuse are trustworthy. 174 
C. APPLYING HEARSAY EXCEPTION § 1370 
1. People v. OJ Simpson 
In the Simpson criminal trial, the court refused to admit 
seven hearsay statements by Nicole Brown Simpson which 
recounted her fear of OJ Simpson, and both actual and threat-
ened physical abuse by OJ Simpson, because they did not con-
form to any of the current hearsay exceptions. 175 
The prosecution offered this evidence under the Code § 
1250, state of mind hearsay exception, arguing that Nicole 
Brown Simpson's state of mind was learned helplessness.176 
639 N.Y.S.2d 907 (1996). 
173. See supra note 43. 
174. Wright, 497 U.S at 818-20 (1990). 
175. People v. Simpson, No. BA097211, 1995 WL 21768, at *4-5 (Cal. Super. 
Doc. Jan. 18, 1995) The following hearsay statements were excluded from the 
Simpson criminal trial: 
(1) A 1986 diary entry containing a graphic description of the physical 
abuse Nicole Brown Simpson suffered at the hands of the defendant. The diary 
states, "He (defendant) beat me up so bad that he tore my blue sweater and blue 
slacks completely off me." [d at *4. 
(2) In 1989, Nicole Brown Simpson told Kris Jenner that the defendant 
would kill her if she ever left him. [d. 
(3) In 1993 Nicole Brown Simpson told D'Anne LeBon that she lived in fear 
of the defendant and that "Everywhere I go, he shows up. I really think he's 
going to kill me." [d. at *4. 
(4) In 1994, Nicole Brown Simpson told her mother, "He (defendant) is fol-
lowing me. I'm driving and he's behind me. [d. 
(5) In 1994 Nicole Brown Simpson told Betsy Rockett that she was planning 
to move from the Bundy address because the defendant was "nuts." She also said 
"OJ's watching me," and that the defendant was peeping in windows again and 
using disguises to follow her. People v. Simpson, No. BA097211, 1995 WL 21786, 
*4 (Cal. Super. Doc.). 
(6) Nicole Brown Simpson told Denise Brown that she was afraid of the 
defendant and that he told her, "I have no reason to live now. [d. 
(7) In 1994, five days before Nicole Brown Simpson's murder, a woman 
identifying herself only as "Nicole" from West Los Angeles called a battered 
women's hotline complaining that her ex-husband was stalking her and that she 
feared him. [d. 
176. People v. Simpson, No. BA097211, 1994 WL 737964 *3-4 (Cal. Super. Doc. 
26
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However, the trial court found that Nicole Brown Simpson's 
state of mind was not at issue and the defendant had not 
raised any issue concerning her conduct prior to the homi-
cide.177 The Simpson trial court reiterated that the California 
Supreme Court clearly held that it was reversible error to 
admit hearsay statements by a homicide victim expressing fear 
of the defendant, even when made on the very day of the mur-
der.178 Thus, the seven hearsay statements by Nicole Brown 
Simpson were not admissible under § 1250.179 
Moreover, the court held that, had the statem.ents 
been admissible under hearsay exception § 1250, the state-
ments still could not withstand a § 352 objection because the 
prejudice of the statements outweighed their probative val-
ue. lSO 
2. OJ Simpson Civil Wrongful Death Trial and the Admissibil-
ity of Hearsay Evidence Under § 1370 
Although § 1370 was intended for use in the Simpson civil 
trial, the Simpson civil COurt181 would have most likely found 
Dec. 12, 1994) In response to the defense motion to exclude evidence of domestic 
violence, the prosecution in the Simpson criminal trial stated: 
[d. 
Victims of Battered Woman Syndrome suffer from a condi-
tion known as "learned helplessness." Learned helpless-
ness was flrst tested in laboratory experiments in which 
dogs were taught that their behavior did not affect the 
frequency of electric shocks inflicted upon them. The dogs 
perceived that there was no relationship between their 
conduct and the shocks which caused distortions in their 
behavior. Instead of trying to escape as they had at the 
beginning of the experiment, the dogs became compliant, 
passive and refused to leave. A similar coping response is 
found in battered women. Since these women are unable 
to predict the consequences of their own actions, they 
respond passively to abuse and will not attempt to leave 
their abuser, even when it appears to outsiders that they 
could do so safely. Furthermore, battered women do not 
leave their batterers because they fear that if they leave, 
they will be found and hurt even more. 
177. People v. Simpson, No. BA097211, 1995 WL 21768, at *4 (Cal. Super. Doc. 
Jan. 18, 1995). 
178. [d. 
179. [d. 
180. CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1996). 
181. Brown, Goldman, Rufo v. Simpson, No. SC036876, SC036340, SC031947, 
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Nicole Brown Simpson's hearsay statements inadmissible un-
der § 1370 due to the statements' inability to meet the require-
ments. 
The 1986 diary entry fails to meet § 1370's requirement 
that the statements be made within five years of the filing of 
the current action.182 The five statements in which Nicole 
Brown Simpson told her friends, her sister and her mother 
that she lived in fear of the defendant and that she thought he 
was going to kill her, fail the requirement that the statements 
narrate, describe or explain the infliction or threat of physical 
. injury on the declarant. l83 These statements merely describe 
her fear of the defendant and her belief that he would kill 
her.l84 The statements do not reiterate any specific threats or 
infliction of physical abuse. l85 In addition, Nicole Brown 
Simpson made the statements to her friends, sister and moth-
er,l85 and therefore fail to meet § 1370's requirement that the 
statement be in writing, electronically recorded, or made to a 
law enforcement official. 187 
The hearsay evidence in which a woman who identified 
herself only as "Nicole" called a battered women's hotline and 
expressed her fear of her ex-husband was not offered by the 
plaintiffs in the civil trial under § 1370.188 However, the 
1996 WL 530984, at *2 (Cal. Super. Doc. Sept. 10, 1996). After OJ Simpson's 
acquittal in the criminal trial, the Goldman and Rufo families filed a wrongful 
death and a survival claim for the death of Ronald Goldman. The Brown family 
filed a survival claim against OJ Simpson in civil court for the death of Nicole 
Brown Simpson. [d. 
182. Brown, Goldman, Rufo v. Simpson, No. SC036876, SC036340, SC031947, 
1996 WL 530984, at *1 (Cal. Super. Doc. Sept. 10, 1996). The Brown's fIled the 
wrongful death complaint on June 12, 1995. The Goldman's fIled on June 9, 1995. 
Rufo fIled on September 7, 1994. [d. 
183. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1370 (West 1997). 
184. People v. Simpson, No. BA097211, 1995 WL 21768, at *4-6 (Cal. Super. 
Doc. Jan. 18, 1995). 
185. [d. 
186. [d. 
187. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1370 (West 1997). 
188. Brown, Goldman, Rufo v. Simpson, No. SC036876, SC036340, SC031947, 
1996 WL 694142, at *1-12 (Cal. Super. Doc. Dec. 14, 1996). The judge in the 
Simpson civil trial admitted the hotline operator's testimony under § 1250, state of 
mind hearsay exception. The operator testified that the caller told her that she 
feared her ex-husband, that he had been stalking her, that he had beaten her, 
and that he threatened to kill her. The plaintiffs offered this evidence under § 
1250 to show Nicole Brown Simpson's state of mind, that she feared the defen-
28
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statements would probably not have been admissible under 
that section because it was unknown if the threats were made 
at or near the time of the phone call. lS9 Again, the statements 
were not in writing, electronically recorded or made to a law 
enforcement official. 190 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Although § 1370 was passed to be available for the use in 
the Simpson civil trial, it was never used in that trial, and at 
the time of this writing, § 1370 has yet to be applied in other 
California courts of law. Although 1370's effect on' the law of 
evidence is rinknown, this Comment indicates the potential of 
this new exception. Section 1370;s requirements are numerous 
and strict, but they are necessary to ensure the admission of 
only reliable hearsay statements of physical abuse. However, 
once the evidence complies with the specific requirements of § 
1370 and any other applicable statutory or cons~itutional re-
quirement, § 1370 becomes an invaluable evidentiary tool 
through which evidence may reach the jury. Section 1370's 
potential lies in the unlimited use for which the evidence of 
physical abuse may be admitted. In particular, § 1370 allows 
using the evidence for all purposes, including proving the de-
fendant carried out the threats and murdered the victim, a use 
strictly forbidden under § 1250, the state of mind hearsay 
exception. 191 
The author of the bill proposing § 1370 expressed high 
expectations for the new exception.192 It is clear that in cases 
dant, and to show the state of the relationship between Nicole Brown Simpson 
and the defendant. The plaintiffs argued that the declarant's state of mind was 
placed in issue when the defendant's attorney stated that "Nicole Brown Simpson 
was hardly afraid of OJ Simpson," in his opening statement. In addition, the 
plaintiffs contended that Nicole Brown Simpson's state of mind would further be 
placed in issue because the defendant was going to testifY that the two were on 
amicable terms. The plaintiffs asserted that since the declarant was deceased, this 
evidence was highly relevant to rebut the previous and expected testimony of the 
defense, and show the defendant's motive for committing the murders. [d. 
189. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1370 (West 1996). 
190. [d. 
191. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1250 (West 1996). 
192. CAL. COMM. ANALYSIS STATEMENT, AsSEMBLY FLoOR BILL NO. 2068, 
8120/96. 
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where the evidence complies with the requirements of § 1370, 
and any other applicable requirement under the Code or the 
California Constitution, § 1370 is capable of meeting those 
expectations. 
Karleen F. Murphy· 
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